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Appellants Daniel Paslay, Gary Ottman, and Tateoka Brothers, LLC (the "Landowners"),
by and through their attorneys ofrecord, Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., hereby submit
Appellants' Reply Brief In this brief, Landowners will continue to use the terms as previously
defined in Appellants ' Brief

I.

INTRODUCTION.

A fable is instructive in considering this case:
A songbird was confined in a cage which hung outside a window, and had
a way of singing at night when all other birds were asleep. One night a bat
came and clung to the bars of the cage, and asked the bird why she was
silent by day and sang only at night. "I have a very good reason for doing
so," said the bird. "It was once when I was singing in the daytime that a
fowler was attracted by my voice, and set his nets for me and caught me.
Since then I have never sung except by night." But the bat replied, "It is no
use your doing that now when you are a prisoner. If only you had done so
before you were caught, you might still have been free."
Precautions are useless after the event.
AESOP'S FABLES 172-73 (V.S. Vernon Jones, trans., Barnes & Noble Classics 2003). Precautions
are useless after the event. Id. Similarly, rights are worthless if they offer no protection until
catastrophe has already occurred.

In this case, Landowners are asserting their rights-

constitutional rights to the water exclusively dedicated to their lands (in Count 1); constitutional
rights to due process (in Count 2); and rights to benefit from and be protected by the fiduciary
duties A&B owes Landowners (in Count 3). From its first appearance, A&B has flooded the
record with facts that are, ultimately, irrelevant because they have no bearing on Landowners'
rights, but describe only current conditions.

Nevertheless, all of Landowners' claims are

justiciable, valid, and A&B is not entitled to summary judgment.
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II.

ARGUMENT.

As an initial matter, A&B claims that Landowners "provide no argument or authority in
support" of the issue regarding whether the District Court erred in denying the Motion for

Reconsideration, and have thus waived the issue. Respondent's Brief, p. 38. This argument is
without merit.

Landowners explicitly cite to their Motion for Reconsideration for reasons

demonstrating error in the District Court's Decisions-see, e.g., Appellants' Brief, pp. 21, 29and Landowners implicitly rely on the same arguments throughout their opening brief. To argue
as A&B proposes would have Landowners presuppose that the District Court correctly dismissed
their claims, but erred in not reconsidering that decision. Landowners are not required to make
this presupposition in order to sufficiently argue that the District Court should have granted their

Motion for Reconsideration and their original motions in the first place.
A&B does not distinguish between the issues of justiciability, the Rule 12(b) standard, or
summary judgment consideration in its discussion of Counts 1, 2, and 3. See Respondent's Brief,
pp. 12-25. This imprecision is not only unhelpful to the necessary analysis, but also does not serve
to derail the inevitable conclusion that the District Court erred in dismissing Landowners' claims.
Landowners make every effort to properly divide the issues raised by A&B among the appropriate
legal standards below. See Sections II.A., II.C., and II.E., infra.
A. Landowners claims in Count 1 and Count 3 are justiciable, in that the claims are ripe for
adjudication and Landowners have standing to bring them.

A&B claims that Landowners' argument about whether justiciability was properly before
the District Court amounts to "form over substance." Respondent's Brief, p. 10. However, a lack
of adequate notice does not exalt form over substance. To provide adequate notice, every motion
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must "state with particularity the grounds therefor." Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b)(l);
Franklin Bldg. Supply Co. v. Hymas, 157 Idaho 632, 640, 339 P.3d 357,365 (2014). A&B's first
Motion to Dismiss did not raise the issue of justiciability or subject matter jurisdiction. See
R., pp. 41-60. A&B did not raise the issue of justiciability until its response to Landowners' first
Motion to Strike and first Motion to Continue (which was also A&B's reply in support of its first
Motion to Dismiss). R., p. 331. Thus, Landowners had just 7 days' notice of A&B'sjusticiability
arguments. This is not about form, but rather about notice and substance itself.
If A&B had filed its motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)( 1)-which is the appropriate motion to

raise justiciability is a motion to dismiss based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, including
justiciability-it would have provided notice regarding A&B's arguments.' Likewise, while A&B
now points out that the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure allow any court to take up the issue of
subject matter jurisdiction at any time, doing so without proper notice to the parties is error.
McGloon v. Gwynn, 140 Idaho 727, 729, 100 P.3d 621,623 (2004) ("The right to procedural due
process ... requires that a person involved in the judicial process be given meaningful notice and
a meaningful opportunity to be heard"). At the hearing on A&B's first Motion to Dismiss,
justiciability was not properly before the Court because Landowners did not have adequate notice,
regardless of whether justiciability was raised sua sponte or by A&B.

While not authoritative, in an unpublished decision, the Idaho Court of Appeals has recognized this point, stating
that "a challenge to standing is generally raised by a party in the trial court by way of an Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure l2(b)(l) motion." Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co. v. Breinholt, No. 40748, 2014 WL 6804502, at *2
(Idaho Ct. App. Dec. 3, 2014).
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-----------------------------------

1. Count 1 is Justiciable.
A&B primarily contends that the District Court correctly dismissed Count 1 because of the
"lack of a cognizable injury" and "speculative harm" included in Count 1. Respondent's Brief, pp.
14, 17 (respectively). However, these contentions are incorrect, because A&B has mis-framed the
issues of Count 1 from the beginning. Ever since A&B first appeared (and first filed a motion to
dismiss), A&B' s incredulity has centered on the fact that Landowners have not already been
shorted water. See R., p. 43. Count 1 has never alleged an already-accomplished taking, but rather,
Count 1 centers on the Landowners' constitutional rights to the surface water that A&B has
distributed to them for decades-specifically, the constitutional right to consent (or withhold
consent) to A&B's deprivation of water exclusively dedicated to Landowners' properties. R.,
pp. 255-57. Once the basis of Count 1 is correctly understood, the injury effectuated by the Project
(and its effects of using surface water on new lands) becomes clear, cognizable, and definite.
Despite A&B's protestations otherwise, the law remains that "[s]tanding may be
predicated upon a threatened harm as well as a past injury." Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho
767, 773, 133 P.3d 1232, 1238 (2006) (citation omitted, emphasis added). Thus, a future injury
grants standing, "[e]ven where there is no immediately apparent damage," wherever there is
"sufficient immediacy and reality" to the injury. ABC Agra, LLC v. Critical Access Grp., Inc., 156
Idaho 781,785,331 P.3d 523,527 (2014).
To assess Landowners' standing, this Court must (as the District Court should have) assess
whether Count 1 alleges a threatened harm that will cause a specific future injury that is sufficiently
immediate (or imminent) and real. See Appellants' Brief, pp. 19, 15-17. The issue is not whether
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Landowners can show a "distinct palpable injury" that they have already suffered.

See

Respondent's Brief, p. 13. Landowners' constitutional rights have been violated by A&B, which
has deprived them of water that is exclusively dedicated to Landowners' properties by constructing
and implementing the Project to dilute the storage water available to Landowners in future years.
In response, A&B first contends that this dilution of storage water caused by the Project is
speculative because it is based on an "erroneous assumption" and that Landowners "have no basis
for such assertions." Respondent's Brief, p. 13. Having a basis for contesting factual argumentssuch as those made by A&B-is difficult without any discovery.

That is the reason for

Landowners' Motions to Continue, which were wrongfully denied by the District Court. See
Section 11.D., infra. But in this vein, A&B argues that "water supplies can vary from year to year,"
and therefore "[ d]elivering surface water to certain acres formerly irrigated with groundwater does
not mean [A&B's] storage rights won't fill again the following year." Respondent's Brief, pp. 1314. While no one can control mother nature and the genesis of water supplies, which admittedly
vary year to year, the use of storage water can be controlled. In fact, control of the use of the
storage water lies at the heart of Count 1. And, while the Project's delivery of storage water does
not prevent the storage rights from refilling; the use of storage water is an irrevocable step that
makes the refilling of the storage right that much less likely. In other words, in an inevitable dry
year, the storage rights will be much more likely to completely refill if 75% of the storage right
has been carried over, rather than 50%. There is no erroneous assumption underlying this logic.
Second, A&B contends that Schneider and Boundary Backpackers are distinguishable
from this case and therefore do not support Landowners' position, but that Coalition for
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Agriculture 's Future and ABC Agra should control. Respondent's Brief, pp. 17-19. But A&B

misconstrues these cases.
One holding in Schneider that A&B iterates and then ignores is the consideration of
whether a later "court [would] be in [a] better position to determine the matter." Respondent's
Brief, p. 17; see also Schneider, 142 Idaho at 773, 133 P.3d at 1238. A&B contends that there,

"[t]he plaintiff was clearly harmed by the physical obstruction in the public easement."
Respondent's Brief, p. 18. However, the harm was initially not as clear as A&B supposes. The

issue was that Schneider, at some undetermined point in the future, intended to subdivide his
property (though he had not yet applied to re-zone his property or even submitted a subdivision
plat) and would therefore need to use the full road easement "for ingress and egress for [the]
potential subdivision." Schneider, 142 Idaho at 772-73, 133 P.3d at 1237-38. Schneider's only
argument demonstrating his need to use the road easement was based on this planned
development of this future potential subdivision. See id. Contrary to A&B' s characterization,
Schneider demonstrates that a threatened future harm is sufficient to grant standing and a claim is

ripe when delaying will add nothing material to determining the relative rights of the parties. Id.
A&B also attempts to distinguish Boundary Backpackers, because there, "the county's law
created an immediate and concrete problem for land managers" while "no such facts are shown
here." Respondent's Brief, p. 18 (emphasis added). A&B is correct that the county ordinance at
issue there created a problem for land managers by "threaten[ing] to disturb the status and
management of federal and state public lands in Boundary County." Boundary Backpackers v.
Boundary Cnty., 128 Idaho 371, 376, 913 P.2d 1141, 1146 (1996).
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However, Boundary

Backpackers was not brought by land managers.

The case was brought by "Boundary

Backpackers, the North Idaho Audubon Society, and Bonners Ferry Forest Watch ... non-profit
membership groups located in the county .... [and] eighteen individuals ... who are residents of
the county." Id. at 374,913 P.2d at 1144. In other words, Boundary Backpackers was not about

"land managers" suing the county, as A&B describes; rather it was brought by private
individuals who used land that would be affected by the county's decision to enact the
ordinance. See id. This Court held that even though the private individuals had not yet been
affected (as the county contended that no agency had changed any practice in order to comply with
the ordinance and the county did not intend to enforce the ordinance), the issue was ripe and
plaintiffs had standing because there was "a substantial likelihood that a declaration of the
unconstitutionality of the ordinance will prevent or redress the claimed injury" and the "issues
[were] definite and concrete," based on "actual and existing facts." See id. at 375-76, 913 P.2d at
1145-46 (citation omitted).
On the other hand, the cases proffered by A&B-Coalition for Agriculture 's Future and
ABC Agra-are not analogous to this case. As previously described, Coalition for Agriculture 's
Future dealt with a citizen's general grievance against a governmental entity (see Appellants'
Brief, p. 18, n. 6), which is not applicable here because Landowners are uniquely and specifically
affected by A&B's decision to undertake the Project. In ABC Agra, the plaintiff was unsure
whether defendant intended to use its property in violation of a prior covenant. ABC Agra, 156
Idaho at 784, 331 P.3d at 526. There, this Court held that no amount of alleging a "likely"
disagreement that "may" affect plaintiff could create a controversy ripe for adjudication. See id.
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- - - - - - - - - - - -

at 785-86, 331 P.3d at 527-28. In other words, additional facts would develop in the future that
would be material to the controversy. Id. at 786,331 P.3d at 528 (J. Jones, J., specially concurring).
This case is not about ensuring A&B obey the law generally, as in Coalition for

Agriculture's Future. Rather, this case is about protecting Landowners' rights (constitutional
rights in Count 1 and 2, and the benefits of A&B's fiduciary duty to Landowners in Count 3) that
are being undermined by A&B. Landowners are not uncertain of A&B's position, as in ABC Agra.
A&B has made clear-in word and deed-that it does not believe it needs Landowners' consent
to use storage water on new lands and will do so regardless of constitutional protections and
fiduciary duties, which is what Landowners are trying to protect. There are no material facts that
need to develop this case; the District Court should have adjudicated Landowners' rights.
Finally, A&B continues to contend that Count 1 is not justiciable because Landowners
"have not been deprived of any water." Respondent's Brief, p. 15. This entirely misses the point
of Count 1. The facts submitted by A&B that Landowners received 3 acre feet during the 2016
irrigation season, that the Project would affect the Landowners' instantaneous delivery rate, or
what A&B claims will happen in 201 7 are irrelevant. Count 1 is not about a taking. The actual
deprivation of water is not (yet) at issue. Count 1 is about Landowners' constitutionally-protected
rights to the surface water exclusively dedicated to Landowners' properties and what A&B is doing
with that dedicated surface water without Landowners' consent. See Idaho Constitution, Art. XV,
§ 4; R., pp. 255-57. Thus, the injury is cognizable, certain, and damaging-sufficient to grant
Landowners standing to assert this ripe claim. The District Court erred in finding otherwise.
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2. Count 3 is Justiciable.
"In order to establish a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must establish that
defendants owed plaintiff a fiduciary duty and that the fiduciary duty was breached." Bushi v.
Sage Health Care, PLLC, 146 Idaho 764, 769, 203 P.3d 694, 699 (2009) (internal quotations,
brackets, and citation omitted). "Generally, whether a fiduciary has breached his duty is a question
of fact." Id. Nevertheless, a plaintiff must also establish standing, although that standing inquiry
must take the elements of the claim somewhat into account-which the District Court never did.
There is not dispute that A&B owes Landowners a fiduciary duty. The scope of that duty is not
well defined, but A&B's arguments (like those of the District Court below) do not address the
scope of A&B's duty, but contend that A&B has not harmed Landowners.
Landowners' first argument remains that, by definition, A&B' s fiduciary duty to
Landowners includes the duty not to reduce the amount of water available for Landowners' future
use without their consent. See Appellants' Brief, p. 32. A&B has not supplied any contrary
authority, argument, or opinion as to the scope of A&B's fiduciary duty. There is at least a
question of fact in Count 3 as to whether the Project has or will reduce the amount of water
available to irrigate Landowners' properties in breach of this fiduciary duty. This is a question of
fact that is ripe and Landowners have standing to bring.
However, for the sake of completeness, Landowners will also reply to A&B's other
challenges to the justiciability of Count 3. A&B challenges the justiciability of Count 3 on three
bases, specifically: Landowners have no enforceable right to the surface water; Landowners have
no cause of action against A&B because Landowners have been delivered water as necessary for
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2016; and any injury to Landowners is speculative. Respondent's Brief, pp. 20-25. This Court
should not accept any of these contentions.
First, A&B contends that Landowners cannot bring Count 3 because they do not have an
enforceable right to the surface water, since Landowners "do not 'own' the molecules of water
diverted and stored under [A&B's] storage water rights." Respondent's Brief, p. 20. A&B is
asserting that it owns the storage water rights and that no part of the storage water is Landowners
"alone." Respondent's Brief, pp. 20, 22. However, A&B's position completely ignores the
fiduciary relationship between A&B and Landowners (along with all other members of A&B).
See Idaho Code §§ 43-316 ("title to all property ... shall be held by such district in trust"
(emphasis added)), 43-1829; U.S. v. Pioneer Irr. Dist., 144 Idaho 106, 114-15, 157 P.3d 600, 60809 (2007). "Irrigation districts act as trustees for the landowners managing the water right, and
standing in place of the landowners in cases involving the appropriate of water." Pioneer, 144
Idaho at 114, 157 P.3d at 608 (citation omitted). Pioneer clarified that the United States Bureau
of Reclamation (the "BOR") (and, applying the same logic, even an irrigation district) cannot hold
complete title to any water right because "the entity that applies the water to beneficial use has a
right that is more than a contractual right" to the water. Id. at 115, 157 P.3d at 609. While none
of the property held in trust is in the beneficiary's name, the beneficiary has an equitable interest
in that property. DBSIITRI Vv. Bender, 130 Idaho 796, 808, 948 P.2d 151, 163 (1997). That
equitable interest is real and enforceable. Estate of Cornell v. Johnson, 159 Idaho 778, __, 367
P.3d 173, 177 (2016) ("a beneficiary has a property interest in the trust res that is enforceable either
in law or in equity"). While A&B denigrates Landowners' interest in the surface water, it does
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not change the nature or enforceability of Landowners' equitable interests asserted in Count 3.
Second, A&B asserts that there can be no cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty
because A&B "did not deny [Landowners] any water from the 'proper irrigation' of their lands in
2016." Respondent's Brief, p. 23. Again, the useful analogy of an ordinary trust demonstrates the
flawed logic of this argument. What A&B is asserting is that as long as a beneficiary is receiving
the annual distributions to which he is entitled, the beneficiary would have absolutely no recourse
against a trustee for spending the principal of the trust on himself. This position is contrary to trust
law and an utter anathema to the very concept of a fiduciary duty. See Beaudoin v. Davidson Trust

Co., 151 Idaho 701, 705, 263 P.3d 755, 759 (2011) (even "a residual beneficiary of a trust may
have a sufficient interest to complain about actions that jeopardize its corpus"). Even though
Landowners received their water in 2016, A&B is not at liberty to use the rest of the storage
water as it sees fit; like the principal of a trust, the storage water must be managed to benefit the

beneficiaries-Landowners (and others), who rely exclusively on surface water.
Third, A&B again asserts that any injury suffered by Landowners is "hypothetical" and
therefore insufficient to make Count 3 justiciable. Respondent's Brief, p. 24. In this respect, A&B
again contends that any future injury is speculative because "the water supply across Idaho varies
year to year." Respondent's Brief, p. 24. Again, while no one can control the generation of water
supplies, which admittedly vary year to year, the use of storage water can be controlled. While
control of the use of storage water lies at the heart of Count 1, Count 3 is about how-independent
of Landowners' constitutional rights at issue in Count 1-A&B has a fiduciary duty not to act in
a manner that dilutes and ultimately depletes the water supply relied upon by Landowners.
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If a trustee uses the trust principal to go gamble on a roulette wheel, the breach of duty is

actionable even if the trustee makes money. It would not matter if the roulette wheel was run by
a charity or another worthy cause. This is because at some point the trustee's bet will fail; and the
beneficiaries will be left with nothing. That is not acting as "a prudent man dealing with the
property of another," as a trustee must always do. Idaho Code§ 15-7-302. Here, the storage water
held by A&B, which is a fixed amount, is the principal of the trust. A&B' s argument that any
injury is speculative is akin to the trustee arguing that he actually made money gambling with the
trust principal. At some point, the trustee will lose on the roulette wheel and, similarly, at some
point there will be a dry year, when carried-over storage water will be essential to Landowners.
By making this gamble (regardless of whether it is for a worthy cause), A&B has not made
Landowners' injury more speculative, but has made A&B' s breach of fiduciary duty more definite.
A&B concludes that"[ w ]ithout a real or threatened injury ... there was no reason to analyze
whether any duty had been breached as required under Idaho trust law." Respondent's Brief, p.
25. In other words, A&B wants to win a one-sided argument of facts without discovery, rather
than actually address Count 3 and Idaho trust law. Yet, because Count 3 is a claim for a breach of
fiduciary duty, all Landowners are required to prove is that A&B "owed a duty and that it was
breached." Respondent's Brief, p. 20 (citations omitted). Ultimately, the injury in a breach of
fiduciary duty is the loss of trust caused by the trustee's infidelity. That injury has occurred here,
sufficient to make Count 3 ripe and grant Landowners standing to bring it.
B. The District Court erred in considering the Temple Affidavits.
A&B claims that Landowners have "point[ed] to no 'clear abuse of discretion' by the
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District Court in denying their [Motions to Strike]."

Respondent's Brief, p. 34.

However,

Landowners have explained how the District Court abused its discretion by (1) failing to
"perceive[] this issue as one of discretion," Appellants' Brief, p. 20, and (2) by denying the

Motions to Strike, considering the Motions to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), and yet considering
the Temple Affidavits, Appellants' Brief, pp. 20-22, which is a failure to apply the correct legal
standard or reach its decision through an exercise of reason.
The District Court made contradictory findings, specifically:
The Court has reviewed the affidavit of Mr. Temple and based on its review,
the Court finds that his testimony and the exhibits attached thereto are
relevant to the allegations of the plaintiffs complaint and that the
foundational showing is sufficient, although based on the allegations of
the complaint in Counts 1 & 2, the affidavit is not essential or necessary
for purposes ofl.R.C.P. 12 (b)(6) [sic]. Therefore, the Motion to Strike
is DENIED.
R., p. 375 (emphasis added, capitalization in original); see also R., p. 614 (Second Decision, p. 3,
n. 2 (adopting the same rationale and holding in a footnote)). It appears that the District Court
found no evidentiary reason to strike the Temple Affidavits, but nevertheless denied the Motions to

Strike because the Temple Affidavits are not needed under a Rule 12(b)(6) analysis. See R., p. 375
(note that "Therefore" at the beginning of the last sentence in the paragraph quoted above describes
the causal link in the District Court's analysis). It is for this reason that the District Court's later
consideration of the Temple Affidavits was erroneous.
There must be more to a trial court's consideration of whether to consider matters outside
the pleadings than just if the evidence is relevant and the summary judgment timeline is followed.

See Respondent's Brief, p. 34. Many courts have held that "it would be inappropriate for [a trial
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court] to convert [a] pre-answer motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment." Childs

v. Meadowlands Basketball Assocs., 954 F.Supp. 994, 997 (D.N.J. 1997); see also McQueen v.
Woodstream Corp., 244 F.R.D. 26, 31, n. 3 (D.D.C. 2007) ("That discretion [to convert a 12(b)(6)
motion into a motion for summary judgment] is not warranted when there has been little or no
discovery by the parties"); Brennan v. Nat'/ Tel. Dfrectory Corp., 850 F.Supp. 331, 335 (E.D.
Penn. 1994) ("Considering the motion as a motion for summary judgment would be improper in
those situations [where there has been no discovery] because the parties may not be able to present
enough material to support or oppose a motion for summary judgment since no factual record has
yet been developed"); see also Machnik v. United States Dep 't of Interior, No. 1:16CV104, 2016
WL 8451469, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 28, 2016), report and recommendation adopted sub nom.

Machnik v. United States, No. 1:16-CV-00104-MR-DLH, 2017 WL 872652 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 3,
2017); Brug v. Enstar Group, Inc., 755 F.Supp. 1247, 1251 (D. Del. 1991); Kurdyla v. Pinkerton

Sec., 197 F.R.D. 128, 131 (D.N.J. 2000). The reasoning expressed in these cases is unassailable.
Under the bare-bones standards described by A&B, this practice-which A&B calls
"common and well-established," Respondent's Brief, p. 6-stands in opposition to the purpose of
"secur[ing] the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of [this] action." Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure l(a) (2015). If allowed, as proposed by A&B, this procedural tactic should be employed
by practically every defendant in every case in Idaho. Why would any defendant forego the
opportunity to challenge facts in a complaint, without filing an answer, against which the plaintiff
would have no recourse as long as the defendant noticed up the hearing on its de facto motion for
summary judgment 28 days after the filing of the motion (before any discovery could possibly be
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due). Allowing what A&B has done will ultimately vitiate Rule 12(b)(6), unfairly tip the scales
of justice in favor of defendants everywhere, and prevent meritorious lawsuits from proceeding
based on a one-sided trial of facts immediately out of the gate. This is why this Court cautioned
against this tactic a 38 years ago. See Osterloh v. State, 100 Idaho, 702,702,604 P.2d 716, 717
(1979); see also Appellants' Brief, pp. 7-8 (quoting Osterloh). It is time to re-state that caution
and clarify the standard for trial courts to decide when to consider matters outside the pleadings.

C. Properly considered under Rule 12(b), Landowners' claims should not be dismissed.
Even though A&B has not posed separate arguments relating to Landowners' claims under
the Rule 12(b) standard, Landowners feel that it is important for a clear analysis to be articulated,
separated, and engaged in. Thus, Landowners have attempted to parse out those issues raised by
A&B that should be addressed under Rule 12(b)( 6).
1. Count 1 states a valid claim for relief, based on Landowners' constitutional rights to
the surface water distributed to them by A&B.
While A&B agrees that the storage rights (and the natural flow rights) "are protectable
private property rights in Idaho," A&B believes it has sole ownership, control, and dominion over
the surface water rights it holds. Respondent's Brief, p. 16. The only authorities A&B ever cites
to support the proposition that "the storage water is appurtenant to and can be used on any lands
within [A&B's] boundaries" are the water rights (including the digital boundary) associated with
the storage rights; Idaho Code §§ 42-219, 42-1411(2)(h); and the affidavit statements of Dan
Temple. Respondent's Brief, pp. 2, 16. A&B misconstrues these authorities and ignores the
constitutional rights (and, in the context of Count 3, fiduciary duties) benefitting Landowners. The
cited statutes only allow, under certain circumstances, the use of a digital boundary, as defined in
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Idaho Code § 42-202B, to define the service area of an irrigation entity. See Idaho Code §§
42-219, 42-1411(2)(h). However, the service area of A&B's water rights only describe the
authorized location where the State of Idaho authorizes use of its resource, which is administered
along with water rights owned by others. The water right does not at all speak to the rights of
individual patrons in Unit A who had the surface water dedicated to their lands. Stated another
way, there is a substantial and significant difference between the authorization to use surface
water on property and the appurtenance of surface water to that property. A&B blurs this

distinction and repeatedly claims that its surface water rights are appurtenant to all of A&B's land
and, along with cites to the water rights, cites the Temple Affidavits to support its position. In fact,
Mr. Temple recognizes this difference and even though A&B cites his affidavit to support its claim
of appurtenance, Respondent's Brief, pp. 16-17, Mr. Temple only states: "The storage water is
authorized to be used for irrigation purposes anywhere within the A&B project place of use, not

just certain lands in Unit A, including not just the [Landowners'] lands." R., p. 63 (emphasis
added).
To be clear, the matter before this Court is not a water rights issue. Rather, it is a
constitutional and property rights matter independent of the elements contained in a water right
issued by the State of Idaho and later decreed in the SRBA. The mere authorization from IDWR
to use surface water within a digitally-depicted area does not end the inquiry. The dedication of
surface water within the confines of a water right--effected by the distribution of water for
irrigation purposes, pursuant to Article XV, § 4 of the Idaho Constitution--creates an enforceable
and protected appurtenance to the land to which surface water has been dedicated. This right is
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independent of what may be authorized under a water right for where a water right can be used. 2
Focusing now on Landowners' constitutional claims, this Court has previously explained
the issue of when water rights are appurtenant to lands in Pioneer. There, the dispute was between
BOR and irrigation entities (including irrigation districts) "regarding ownership interests" in
storage water rights. Pioneer, 144 Idaho at 108, 157 P.3d at 602. The irrigation entities contended
that "without an equitable interest [in the storage water rights], they [were] vulnerable." Id. at 115,
157 P.3d at 609. This Court found persuasive the rule explained by the United States Supreme
Court that "the right to the use of water acquired under the provisions of [the Reclamation] Act
shall be appurtenant to the land irrigated, and beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure, and
the limit of the right." Id. at 112, 157 P.3d at 606 (quoting Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589,
614, 65 S.Ct. 1332, 1349, 89 L.Ed. 1815, 1829 (1945)) (brackets in original, emphasis added).
This Court elucidated that "[t]here are several phrases used in the Idaho Constitution and the Idaho
Code that signify that the beneficial users have an interest [in storage water] that is stronger than

However, in the interest of thoroughness, it is necessary to address A&B's water rights argument, even
though it is not related to Landowners' claims. The inference that A&B's water rights can be used anywhere
within its service area is not completely accurate based upon review of A&B's water rights. The digital boundary
of an irrigation entity describes the outer limits of where the irrigation entity's service area is located, but as to
A&B, its surface and ground water rights are further limited to a defmed irrigated acreage within the service area.
More specifically, A&B has a service area of 82,610.1 acres, R. , p. 154, but the surface water rights are limited
to the irrigation of only 14,637 acres within that service area, Id., and the ground water rights are limited to the
irrigation of66,686.2 acres within that service area. R., p. 289. This means that ground water cannot be used to
irrigate the entire A&B 82,610.1- acre service area because doing so would be an illegal enlargement of the water
right. Similarly, A&B's natural flow water rights could not irrigate more than 14,637 acres in an irrigation season
within the 82,610.1-acre service area.
Additionally, the elements of BOR's storage water rights are very broadly defined and only list a place of
use by Idaho county descriptions. R., p. 158. Accordingly, if Landowners consented to use of storage water
dedicated to its lands to be used elsewhere, the storage water would of necessity need to be authorized to cover
the area where the storage water is to be used under the water right. Otherwise, the water use would be illegal
under Idaho Code§ 42-351, and possibly subject to an enforcement action by the Director ofIDWR under Idaho
Code§ 42-17018.
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mere contractual expectancy." Pioneer, 144 Idaho at 114, 157 P.3d at 608 (emphasis added) (also
noting that this "perpetual right" is supported by Idaho Constitution, Art. XV, § 4 and Idaho Code
§§ 42-220, § 42-915). Thus, it is "the entity that applies the water to beneficial use [that] has a
right that is more than a contractual right" while "[t]he irrigation districts hold an interest on behalf
of the water users." Pioneer, 144 Idaho at 115, 157 P.3d at 609; see also Idaho Code§§ 43-316,
43-1829. As a result, despite the BOR's name appearing as the water right holder:

as a matter of Idaho constitutional and statutory law title to the use of
the water is held by the consumers or users of the water. The irrigation
organizations act on behalf of the consumers or users ... The interest of
the consumers or users of the water is appurtenant to the lands within
the boundaries of or served by such irrigation organizations, and that
interest is derived from law and is not based exclusively on the contracts
between the [BOR] and the irrigation organizations.
Pioneer, 144 Idaho at 115, 157 P.3d at 609 (emphasis added). 3 Thus, even where an irrigation
district is the signatory to the BOR contracts, the interest is appurtenant to the lands where the
water user (not the irrigation district) applies the water to beneficial use. Id.
The Idaho Constitution mandates that "[p ]riority of appropriation shall give the better right
as between those using the water." Idaho Constitution, Art. XV,§ 3. Similarly, whenever water
is appropriated for agricultural purposes any "sale, rental, or distribution [of this water] shall be
deemed an exclusive dedication to such use," and the distributee receiving this water "shall not
thereafter, without his consent, be deprived of the annual use of the same, when needed for
domestic purposes, or to irrigate the land so settled upon or improved," as long as he pays for the

This language appears on all of the water rights associated with the storage water used by A&B. See SRBA
Partial Decrees for Water Right Nos. 01-2068, 01-10043, 01-I0621A, and 01-1062IB.
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water and complies with other reasonable terms on his use. Idaho Constitution, Art. XV, § 4.
Further, when two such distributees are receiving water from a distributor, "priority in time shall
give superiority of right to the use of such water." Idaho Constitution, Art. XV,§ 5. After quoting
these constitutional provisions, this Court explained:
These constitutional provisions apply to irrigation districts. The defendant
district, having acquired by purchase the rights of the original
appropriator and having itself made subsequent appropriations and
purchases of water, stands in the position of appropriator for
distribution to the landowners within the district, within the meaning of
Const., Art. 15, § 1. The district holds title to the water rights in trust for the
landowners. The landowners, to whose lands the water has become
dedicated by application thereon to a beneficial use, have acquired the
status and rights of distributees under Const., Art. 15, §§ 4 and 5.

Bradshaw v. Milner Low Lift Irr. Dist., 85 Idaho 528, 545, 381 P.2d 440, 449 (1963) (emphasis
added, citations omitted). As a result, the irrigation district could not "shar[ e] or impair[]"the
water rights of the distributees-i. e., the owners of the land where water was dedicated by virtue
of its application thereon to beneficial use-without their consent. Id. at 546,381 P.2d at 450.
A&B also contends that Count 1 fails as a matter of law because Landowners "could not
show they were being deprived of the annual use of water they could put to beneficial use during
the 2016 irrigation season. Instead, it is undisputed they received full water delivery upon request."

Respondent's Brief, p. 16 (emphasis in original, citation omitted). This argument contorts the
meaning of the constitutional term "annual use." Idaho Constitution, Art. XV, § 4 (once water
becomes dedicated to a user's property, the user "shall not thereafter, without his consent, be
deprived of the annual use of the same, when needed ... to irrigate the land so settled upon or
improved" (emphasis added)). A&B somehow interprets "annual use" to mean the use in a given
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-----------------

year-as relevant here, during 2016. Respondent's Brief, p. 16. But that is not what "annual"
means. Annual means: "l of or measured by a year 2 happening or appearing once a year; yearly
3 for a year's time, work, etc." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 58 (5th ed. 2014).
A&B's proposed interpretation equates "annual" with "present," while annual actually denotes a
yearly recurrence. The Idaho Constitution makes that especially clear.
In considering what became Sections 4 and 5 of Article XV of the Idaho Constitution at
the Constitutional Convention ofldaho in 1889, a few delegates proposed changes, however:
The president of the convention, Mr. Claggett, on the other hand, seemed to
have a very clear understanding of the provisions and was the only one who
spoke in favor of their adoption, and his discussion and explanation seems
to have been accepted by the majority of the convention as they voted down
the amendments presented by Gray, Hampton, and Poe, and adopted the
provisions as they now stand.

Mellen v. Great W Beet Sugar Co., 21 Idaho 353, __, 122 P. 30, 32 (1912); see also Clear
Springs Foods, Inc. v. Spackman, 150 Idaho 790,806,252 P.3d 71, 87 (2011) (citing Mellen and
utilizing Mr. Claggett's explanation). In this setting, Mr. Claggett explained with regard to Section
4 of Article XV, that once applied for agricultural purposes, the water is "dedicated to the use,
and when it [the water] has once been sold to any one particular party in one year, then he shall

have the right to demand it annually thereafter upon paying for it." II Proceedings and
Debates of the Constitutional Convention ofldaho 1889, 1178-79 (I.W. Hart ed., Caxton Printers,
Ltd., 1912) (emphasis added). Thus, "annual use" denotes a continuing, prospective right to the
water dedicated in accordance with Section 4, Article XV of the Idaho Constitution. Wilterding v.

Green, 4 Idaho 773, __ , 45 P. 134, 135 (1896) (noting that the Idaho Constitution, Article XV,
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Section 4 "gives the party using such water under the conditions a perpetual right to such use"
(emphasis added)). For that reason, the facts of 2016 are irrelevant to Count 1, which alleges that
A&B is interfering in Landowners' right to the annual use of surface water without Landowners'
consent by irrigating acres in Unit B, where it has never before been used (or usable).
Because Count 1 partakes somewhat of the nature of an intra-district dispute, Section 5,
Article XV of the Idaho Constitution must also be considered. Because Section 5 explicitly
references Section 4, "[t]he two sections must therefore be read and construed together." Clear
Springs Foods, 150 Idaho at 805,252 P.3d at 86 (citation omitted). Section 5 provides, in part:

Whenever more than one person has settled upon, or improved land with
the view of receiving water for agricultural purposes, under a sale, rental,
or distribution thereof, as in the last preceding section of this article
provided, as among such persons, priority in time shall give superiority of
right to the use of such water[.]
Idaho Constitution, Art. XV, § 5. As Mr. Claggett again explained in regard to the operation of
these two constitutional provisions:
both of these sections apply to the same condition of things. . . . [They]
appl[y] to cases only as both sections specify, saying to those cases where
waters are "appropriated or used for agricultural purposes under a sale,
rental or distribution." The first section [Section 4] protects the person
who comes in, by making it "an exclusive dedication" to agricultural
uses after it has been so appropriated and so used. But then the question
come in with regard to where there is more than one person who settles
beneath the line of one of those agricultural ditches, which are constructed
for the purpose of selling the water or renting it or distributing it, or which
are used for that purpose, although they may not originally have been so
constructed. Now, when these two or three or four or five or six or seven
parties come in, what are you going to do? Are you going to give the first
man the right to the water? Suppose the first man comes along and the first
year he breaks up and calls for water for twenty acres of land. The next year
he calls for water for forty acres, and the next year for sixty acres, and the
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next year for two or three hundred acres, enough to practically exhaust it.
Anyone can see that by recognizing absolute priority of right in that way,
that the first person settling under the line of the ditch would have the first
call on the water to the extent that he might be able to go ahead and improve
the land afterwards. . .. [T]he constitution proposes simply to point out the
line of the principles within which legislation must be carried on; that is to
say, to recognize the right of priority in the order of time of settlement
or improvement[.]
II Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of Idaho 1889, 1180-81 (emphases
added). To be entitled to these protections, the settlement or improvement "must of necessity be
an actual settlement or an actual improvement," as constructive settlement or improvement is not
efficacious. Mellen, 21 Idaho at _ _, 122 P. at 31. This actual settlement or improvement must
be made "with the view of receiving water for agricultural purposes," Idaho Constitution, Art. XV,
§ 5, which is to say that the only waters dedicated (and thus protected by Sections 4 and 5) are
those actually "used" on the "settled upon or improved land." Idaho Constitution, Art. XV, § 4.
Thus, this Court has stated:
It was clearly intended that whenever water is once appropriated by any
person or corporation for use in agricultural purposes under a sale, rental or
distribution, that it shall never be diverted from that use and purpose so
long as there may be any demand for the water and to the extent of such
demand for agricultural purposes.

Viking Const., Inc. v. Hayden Lake Irr. Dist., 149 Idaho 187, 199, 233 P.3d 118, 130 (2010)
(quoting Mellen, 21 Idaho at 359, 122 P. at 31-32) abrogated on other grounds by Verska v. Saint

Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889,265 P.3d 502 (2011) (emphasis added).
Landowners and their predecessors-in-interest actually settled and improved their lands in
order to irrigate with the surface water (including the storage water) from A&B. R., pp. 248, 250.
This actual settlement and improvement made beneficial use of the surface water. R., p. 24 7. This
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created the "exclusive dedication" of that water to Landowners' properties. Idaho Constitution,
Art. XV,§ 4. None of Unit B was originally capable of utilizing surface water because A&B was

conceived as two separate systems: Unit A using surface water and Unit B using
groundwater. R., pp. 248-49. Therefore, as to the surface water, Unit A members (including
Landowners) have a "priority in time" and, thus, a "superiority of right" compared with Unit B. 4
Idaho Constitution, Art. XV,§ 5. As a result, the water exclusively dedicated to Landowners'

properties and protected by their superior right thereto can only be taken from Landowners
with their consent. Idaho Constitution, Art. XV,§ 4.
Landowners, like the irrigation entities in Pioneer, contend that without any interest in the
water, they are vulnerable. This vulnerability lies in A&B's position (erroneously vindicated by
the District Court) that it can do anything with any water right in its name that is approved by a
majority of A&B's members, coupled with A&B's ability to determine how water is diverted in
its boundaries. The surface water rights at issue here do not belong entirely to A&B-Landowners
have constitutionally-protected interests in A&B's surface water rights, made appurtenant to
Landowners' properties by A&B's distribution to Landowners' properties and the application of
the surface water to beneficial use thereon. Because surface water has never been used (or even
been capable of being used) in the Unit B acres converted by the Project, Landowners' "priority
in time" must give them "superiority ofright to the use of such water," and they cannot be deprived
of any water appurtenant to Landowners' property without their consent. Idaho Constitution, Art.

4

It is also important to note that this protection cuts both ways. That is to say that Unit B has a "superiority of
right," compared with Unit A members, to the groundwater Unit B members have put to use.
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XV,§§ 4, 5. A&B has not already prevented the delivery of water to Landowners-but A&B has
violated Landowners' constitutionally-protected rights to the water exclusively dedicated to
Landowners' properties and (without Landowners' consent) will use storage water, that would
otherwise continue to be stored on behalf of Landowners and others, on lands that have never
before been irrigated with surface water. A&B has not refuted the applicability of Sections 1, 3,
4, and 5 of Article XV of the Idaho Constitution, as alleged in Landowners' Amended Complaint.
R., pp. 255-57. Thus, Landowners have stated a valid cause of action that withstands A&B's

Motions to Dismiss under the Rule l 2(b) standard.
2. Count 2 states a valid claim for relief, based on Landowners' constitutional rights to
due process.
Landowners and A&B appear to agree that it is improper for a court to take judicial notice
of a collateral case when considering the motion to dismiss under the Rule l 2(b) standard.

Appellants' Brief, pp. 28-29; Respondent's Brief, p. 28. The parties also agree that the District
Court took judicial notice of the Judicial Confirmation Proceeding. Where the parties disagree is
as to the actual standard applied by the District Court. A&B states that "the District Court properly
recognized the summary judgment standard applied since materials outside the pleadings were
submitted in support of [A&B's] motion to dismiss." Respondent's Brief, p. 28 (citing R., p. 373
(the portion of the First Decision generally discussing the legal standards)). A&B also quotes the

First Decision's consideration of Landowners' first Motion to Strike, where the District Court
concluded that "[t]reating the motion as one for summary judgment is not error so long as the
hearing and notice requirements of I.R.C.P. 56(c) are complied with." Respondent's Brief, p. 29
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(quoting R., p. 375).
What A&B ignores is the only relevant question: what standard did the District Court
actually apply in considering A&B' s Motion to Dismiss in relation to Count 2? In other words,

it does not matter that the District Court recognized the correct standard if it failed to apply the
correct standard. In the only portion of the First Decision probative of this question, the District
Court explained its basis for dismissing Count 2:
the defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count 2 for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) is GRANTED on
the basis that the final judgment in Minidoka County Case No. CV-2014189 [i.e., the Judicial Confirmation Proceeding] is not subject to collateral
attack and the claims of the plaintiffs are barred by the doctrine of res
judicata.
R., p. 384 (capitalization in original). This shows that the District Court erroneously considered
Count 2 under the Rule l 2(b) standard, rather than the summary judgment standard.
A&B contends that its "assessment for the approved loans does not violate [Landowners']
constitutional rights or this court's precedent," and that "[i]n this regard, [Landowners'] argument
is no different than a citizen claiming a successful school bond levy is unconstitutional because he
or she has no children attending the school." Respondent's Brief, p. 29; id., p. 29, n. 27. However,
the difference between Landowners and the school bond levy analogy lies in the Bradshaw
decision, which provides a basis for Landowners' constitutional claim. The Bradshaw Court laid
out two reasons the assessment at issue there was not allowed: first, because the annexation
document precluded the assessment on the "old lands" and, second, because "the imposition of
such additional costs and burdens upon the owners of the old lands, without their consent, would
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be an invasion of their constitutionally protected property rights." Bradshaw, 85 Idaho at 548, 3 81
P.2d at 451 (citing Idaho Constitution, Art. I,§§ 13 and§ 14; other citations omitted).
In this regard, A&B goes so far as to call the second rationale explained by the Bradshaw
Court "dicta" and urges that it be completely disregarded. Respondent's Brief, p. 30, n. 28.
Landowners have demonstrated how the use of the word "moreover" in the Bradshaw decision
shows that the two reasons are independent and each is sufficient to support the ultimate holding
in regard to the assessments. See Appellants' Brief, p. 30. It appears that A&B's categorization
of the Bradshaw Court's constitutional basis for not allowing the assessments on the old lands as
"dicta" lies solely in the fact that it is the second item in a list of two. That is not a persuasive
reason to disregard a portion of the Bradshaw Court's reasoning.
Ultimately, both A&B and the District Court try to distinguish Bradshaw on the basis of
the annexation that occurred there. Respondent's Brief, p. 30. However, the annexation provides
more of an analogy to this case than a basis by which to distinguish Bradshaw. There, the irrigation
district annexed in 4,000 new acres. Bradshaw, 85 Idaho at 537, 381 P.2d at 444. The new acres
had not been irrigated with water from the irrigation district, and could not have been as the
infrastructure was not in place to do so. Id at 535, 381 P.2d at 442. The assessment at issue was
to pay for "the enlargement of the existing pumping plant and main canal, the construction of
additional laterals, and the pumping of the water for such lands to an average elevation of 150
feet," where the average lift required for the old lands was just 77 feet. Id.
Here, the Project will provide surface water to 1,500 acres of Unit B (owned by thirty-one
persons) that have never before been capable of being irrigated with surface water-making them,
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in effect, new acres for purposes of surface water irrigation. R., pp. 68, 445. The Project includes
the construction of infrastructure necessary to allow the irrigation of the 1,500 acres of Unit B. R.,
p. 445. The assessments were levied by A&B to pay for the Project, primarily for the benefit of
the thirty-one people who own the 1,500 acres of Unit Bat issue. R., p. 258. Thus, while there is
not an actual, de Jure annexation in this case; the Project is intended to effectuate a de facto
annexation that makes Bradshaw analogous to the facts presented here. Even though there is no
annexation agreement here, the analogous facts lend support to the application of the Bradshaw
Court's second, alternative, constitutional basis for preventing an assessment that does not benefit
the parties challenging the assessment.
A&B has not submitted any other argument relating to Count 2 that does not rely on matters
outside the pleadings of this case. It is this case's similarities to the facts of Bradshaw and the
second rationale explained by the Bradshaw Court together with the constitutional language of
Sections 13 and 14, Article I of the Idaho Constitution that demonstrate the validity of Count 2 of
Landowners' Amended Complaint. As a result, there is no basis to dismiss Count 2 under the Rule
12(b) standard, and the District Court erred in doing so.
3. Count 3 states a valid claim for relief, based on the actions taken by A&B that will
inevitably harm Landowners, violating A&B' s fiduciary duties to Landowners.
A&B 's argument in relation to Count 3 appears to be centered entirely on the justiciability
of Count 3. See Respondent's Brief, p. 25 ("Without a real or threatened injury ... there was no
reason to analyze whether any duty had been breached as required under Idaho trust law"). As
discussed above, Count 3 is justiciable. See Section 11.A.2., supra. Nevertheless, A&B raised
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some points that are best suited to a substantive consideration under the Rule 12(b) standard.
First, in response to Landowners' position that the use of a fixed surface water supply being
used on additional acres will inevitably lessen, or dilute, the amount of surface water available for
their prior-irrigated acres, A&B responds that such an action is allowed by Idaho Code§ 42-222(1)
and the IDWR. Respondent's Brief, p. 20, n. 20. A&B argues that "[t]he same principle"
established in the statute and IDWR order "applies here." Respondent's Brief, p. 20, n. 20. The
problem with this contention is that the authorities cited by A&B have absolutely no relation
to Count 3. Landowners assert that A&B has breached its fiduciary duty. As this Court has

explained that "[t]he term fiduciary implies that one party is in a superior position to the other and
that such a position enables him to exercise influence over one who reposes special trust and
confidence in him." High Valley Concrete, L.L.C. v. Sargent, 149 Idaho 423,428,234 P.3d 747,
752 (2010) (citation omitted); see also Country Cove Dev., Inc. v. May, 143 Idaho 595, 603, 150
P.3d 288, 296 (2006). The fiduciary relationship between Landowners and A&B is irrefutable.
By participating in A&B, Landowners have entrusted certain property (e.g., surface water rights)
to A&B, which exercises immense influence over Landowners because of that trust and
confidence. Similar to the above-noted distinction between authorization and appurtenance, see
Section 11.C.l., supra, Idaho Code§ 42-222(1) does not necessarily mean that doing so will not
breach a fiduciary duty A&B owes to Landowners. See High Valley Concrete, 149 Idaho at 428,
234 P.3d at 752. A trustee may sell property-but doing so with property held in trust may violate
his fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries. Further, the administrative order cited by A&B (which is
legal authority) in this regard strongly indicates that the relationships between the BOR and A&B,
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as well as between Landowners (and other district members) and A&B are distinct and separate
from A&B's relationship with IDWR, which is tasked with administering water rights according
to Idaho law. R., p. 168 ("These relationships are not described by Department water right
documents"). In short, Count 3 relates to A&B' s fiduciary duties, not the baseline statutory law
A&B claims justifies its actions.
A&B' s second contention is that its "storage water rights are appurtenant to and can be
used on any lands within the irrigation district boundary" as directed within A&B' s absolute,
unfettered discretion. Respondent's Brief, p. 21. In this respect, A&B ignores the fact that the
fiduciary duty it owes to Landowners, which-by definition-limits A&B' s discretion to act, even
if such actions would otherwise be lawful.
However, A&B goes even further, claiming that its storing water (or, in A&B's
exaggerative terminology, "hoard[ing]" the water) on Landowners' behalf would be an unlawful,
Respondent's Brief, p. 22, and point to this Court's support of the IDWR's requirement that A&B

"must work to reasonably interconnect some individual wells or well systems before a delivery
call can be filed." A & B Irr. Dist. v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 153 Idaho 500,516,284 P.3d
225, 241 (2012) (quoted in Respondent's Brief, p. 21 ). As to the case involving A&B, that directive
dealt with the interconnection of "some individual wells or well systems." A & B Irr. Dist. v.
IDWR, 153 Idaho at 516,284 P.3d at 241 (emphasis added). At issue there was the requirements

imposed by IDWR on A&B's 177 individual wells that comprised 130 separate systems. Id. at
503, 284 P.3d at 228. This Court sustained IDWR's requirement that A&B "work to reasonably
interconnect" those wells and systems. Id. at 513,284 P.3d at 241. That holding (and the IDWR
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order) were limited to wells and well systems-i.e., groundwater infrastructure-because A&B
had filed "a ground water to ground water delivery call." Id at 502, 284 P.3d at 227. The holding
has no relation to the use (or interconnection) of surface water at issue in this case.
A&B seems to believe that honoring Landowners' constitutional rights and its own
fiduciary duties would force A&B to unconstitutionally maintain an excessive amount of (or
"hoard") carryover of stored water. Respondent's Brief, p. 22. This is not accurate. The rights
asserted by Landowners (under the Idaho constitution and resulting from A&B' s fiduciary duties)
do not require A&B to retain stored water on Landowners' behalf; but rather requires A&B to
obtain Landowners' consent before A&B can use the water elsewhere.

In the case cited by A&B in support of its position that Landowners are encouraging waste
by storing water, the primary issue in that case was whether IDWR's Conjunctive Management
Rules (the "CMRs"}-which address delivery calls by senior surface water users against junior
ground water users-were constitutional. Respondent's Brief, p. 22; see American Falls Reservoir
Dist. No. 2 v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 143 Idaho 862,866, 154 P.3d 433,437 (2007) ("AFRD
#2"). One of the issues raised under the CMRs water whether it was constitutional for IDWR to

consider "reasonable carryover storage" in determining material injury as described in IDAP A
37.03.11.042.01. However, this rule is specific to a delivery call situation, which is not in the same
context as Landowners' claims in this matter. AFRD #2 does not hold that storing water is waste.
Indeed, the law in Idaho is that once "water is stored, it becomes 'the property of the appropriators
... impressed with the public trust to apply it to beneficial use."' AFRD #2, 143 Idaho at 879, 154
P.3d at 450 (quoting Washington Cnty. Irr. Dist. v. Talboy, 55 Idaho 382, 385, 43 P.2d 943, 945
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(1935)). "Storage water is water held in a reservoir and is intended to assist the holder of the water
right in meeting their decreed needs. Carryover is the unused water in a reservoir at the end of the
irrigation year which is retained or stored for future use in years of drought or low-water." AFRD
#2, 143 Idaho at 878, 154 P.3d at 449 (citation omitted). These "[s]torage water rights are entitled

to the same protection as any other type of property right." In re SRBA, 157 Idaho 385, 393, 336
P .3d 792, 800 (2014) (citation omitted).
Additionally, A&B has overstated what Landowners' want, which is a commitment that
they will have three acre-feet per acre always available to them each irrigation season before A&B
uses storage water elsewhere on Unit B lands. A&B instead claims unfettered discretion to use
storage water where it wants and how it wants. Accordingly, Landowners are not arguing that
A&B must carryover a certain amount of storage water or otherwise "hoard" water only for the
benefit of Landowners, rather, Landowners simply want their priority position in the surface and
storage water recognized and protected before such water can be moved elsewhere.
A&B must follow the law by honoring Landowners' constitutional rights (in Count 1) and
complying with A&B's fiduciary duties to Landowners (in Count 3). The facts remain that a
prudent person would not dilute a limited supply of a finite resource that had been exclusively
dedicated to the benefit of certain beneficiaries, even if that dilution would benefit other
beneficiaries. Thus, Landowners have stated a valid claim for relief in Count 3.
D. The District Court abused its discretion by not continuing proceedings on A&B's Motions
to Dismiss to require the filing of an answer and discovery in this case.

In relation to Landowners' Motions to Continue, A&B claims that the District Court
"recognized the applicable rule and identified the deficiencies in the affidavit of the [Landowners']
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counsel." Respondent's Brief, p. 35 (citing R., p. 374-75; Tr., p. 9, L. 17-p. 10, L. 4). This reads
far too much into the District Court's statements.
Along with Landowners' first Motion to Continue, they submitted the Affidavit of Robert

L. Harris in Support of Motion to Continue (the "Harris Affidavit"). R., pp. 302-320. The Harris
Affidavit included the first set of discovery requests posed to A&B by the Landowners. R., pp.
308-320. The Harris Affidavit showed discovery needed by Landowners to respond to A&B's
first Motion to Dismiss. Specifically, the Harris Affidavit described: the issue of what benefits
(and costs) the Project would pose to Landowners (R., p. 303,

,r 8); discovery requests aimed at

locating employees of A&B for deposition (R., p. 304, ,r 9); whether A&B acts in Unit B's interest
to the detriment of Unit A (including Landowners) (R., p. 304, ,r 13); the exact impact and effect
of A&B using surface water on an additional 1,500 acres in Unit B (R., pp. 304-05, ,r,r 14-15);and
how, exactly, A&B takes account of Landowners' rights (R., p. 305, ,r,r 16-17).
Later, on reconsideration, Landowners submitted the Second Affidavit of Robert L. Harris

in Support of Motion for Reconsideration (the "Second Harris Affidavit"), which also supported
Landowners' second Motion to Continue. R., pp. 439-490. The Second Harris Affidavit included
exhibits showing issues relevant to this case, specifically: A&B has previously stated that the
Project will only benefit just 4,000 acres of Unit A 5 (R., p. 445); an acknowledgment from BOR
employee Mike Beus that the Project "could put more demands on storage water and possibly

This written statement, from A&B, contradicts and impeaches A&B's newer position that "all Unit A landowners
would receive an increase in delivery rate from 0.75 to I miner's inch per acre." Respondent's Brief, p. 3 (citing
R., pp. 66, 68). Landowners contend that they are not included in the 4,000 acres that would be benefitted by
increased delivery rates. R., p. 254 (Amended Complaint, ,r 42). Landowners obviously have a basis to dispute
this fact proposed by A&B, but without discovery have not had the ability to confirm their disputation.
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'dilute' Unit A's water availability" (R., p. 448); the facts that A&B's "2004-05 management
decisions created water shortages for only Unit A members" (R., p. 448); the 1955 BOR report
noting that "The 47,000 acre-feet of American Falls space allotted to Unit A of the North Side
Pumping Division [which became A&B], therefore, is a vital asset which will furnish the base

supply of irrigation water for Unit A" and that "sufficient space would be required in Palisades
Reservoir to provide an adequate supply in all of the years [especially years of drought] from
hold-over storage" (R., p. 454 (emphasis added)); and facts that a major reason for settling in Unit
A was the surface water system, which "would guarantee a minimum of three years of water if no
additional water was added" (R., p. 461).
The First Decision, cited by A&B, provides the District Court's written consideration of
Landowners' first Motion to Continue. R., p. 373-74. In fact, because of the mere footnote
treatment of Landowners' second Motion to Continue in the Second Decision, R., p. 614, n. 2, the

First Decision constitutes the District Court's only written consideration of the Motions to
Continue. This is problematic, because the District Court never considered the Second Harris
Affidavit in relation to the Motions to Continue. See R., pp. 506-09 (discussing the Harris Affidavit
and the Second Harris Affidavit). In its First Decision, the District Court, without considering,
citing to, or analyzing the Harris Affidavit at all, held: Landowners "ha[ve] not made a showing
that they are unable to present specific facts to support their opposition to the motion [to dismiss].
They merely assert that they should be entitled to discovery before the motion is heard by the
[District] Court." R., p. 374. This does not identify any deficiencies, but only misstates what
Landowners has asserted and submitted. Even at the hearing, the District Court asked:
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But isn't the standard [under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(t) (2015)]
more as to what facts you need that you cannot obtain at this time to oppose
a summary judgment motion? If the issues presented based upon the
pleadings -- and whether it's characterized as a summary judgment motion
or a 12(b)(6) motion, if the issues presented are a question of law, doesn't
there have to be some presentation of what facts are out there that we
haven't had the opportunity to obtain? Not just that we want to do discovery,
but what facts are there that are not before the Court that need to be before
the Court for the Court to properly determine such motion.
Tr., p. 9, L. 17-p. 10, L. 4. Despite both the response of Landowners' counsel, Tr., p. 10, L. 1820, and the contents of the Harris Affidavit, R., pp. 302-320, to the contrary, the District Court
remained fixated on misstating Landowners' position as merely providing a blanket assertion that
discovery was needed. R., p. 374. Disregarding the record and ignoring arguments raised, as the
District Court did here, is an abuse of discretion.
This abuse of discretion is compounded by the posture of the case (and arguments) at the
time of the First Decision and the District Court's refusal to provide any analysis of this issue in
its Second Decision. It is important to remember that nowhere in A&B's first Motion to Dismiss
did A&B raise the issue of justiciability. See R., pp. 41-53. The issue of justiciability was first
raised in A&B's response to Landowners' first Motion to Strike and Motion to Continue (which
was also A&B's reply in support of its first Motion to Dismiss), R., pp. 331-35-by which time
Landowners could not submit a responsive affidavit. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b )(3 ). Thus,
Landowners could not submit an affidavit dealing with justiciability for the District Court to
consider in its First Decision. The District Court's refusal to provide any analysis of the issue in
its Second Decision further compounds this abuse of discretion.
The District Court found that Landowners' Motions to Continue should be denied because
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"the facts of the underlying action are not truly in dispute." R., p. 374. Likewise, A&B continues
to lean on its contention that "there were no facts in dispute." Respondent's Brief, p. 35. It is
difficult to dispute facts when no discovery has been allowed-which is the chief reason why
Landowners could not "present ... facts essential to justify [their] opposition" to A&B's Motions

to Dismiss under the summary judgment standard. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(t) (2015).
Unfortunately, that is all the District Court focused on. But the Harris Affidavit and the Second

Harris Affidavit explicitly demonstrate specific facts needed and anticipated.
Finally, A&B contends that because Landowners responded to its Motions to Dismiss,
providing argument under the summary judgment standard, Landowners "did not show anything
missing that was 'essential' to justify their opposition." Respondent's Brief, p. 36. This contention
takes the language of Rule 56(t) too far. Facts may be essential for an opposition; yet in the
exercise of due care, a party may still present such opposition as it can muster without undermining
its position regarding necessary facts. The District Court abused its discretion, chiefly by refusing
to actually consider the affidavits submitted with Landowners' Motions to Continue.

E. Considered as a motion for summary judgment, A&B is not entitled to judgment as a
matter of law and, in fact, summary judgment should be granted in Landowners' favor.
In seeking summary judgment, "[t]he moving party bears the burden of establishing the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Aardema v. US. Dairy Sys., Inc., 147 Idaho 785,
793,215 P.3d 505, 513 (2009) (citation omitted). "Thus, it follows that if the moving party fails

to challenge an element of the nonmovant's case, the initial burden place on the moving party
has not been met and therefore does not shift to the nonmovant." Id. (citation omitted,
emphasis added). A&B has presented, and continues to present, many facts in this case. Yet, these

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF-PAGE 35

facts have little bearing on Motions to Dismiss considered under the summary judgment standard.
1. A&B is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to Count 1 because A&B is
diluting the water available to Landowners in violation of the Idaho Constitution.
At the outset, Count 1 is explicitly based on the Idaho Constitution, Article XV,§§ 1, 3, 4,
and 5. R., pp. 255-57. Neither A&B nor the District Court has ever challenged the applicability
of these constitutional provisions. Thus, as an unchallenged element of Landowners' case, there
is no burden on Landowners to prove anything-the Amended Complaint is sufficient. Aardema,
147 Idaho at 793,215 P.3d at 513; see also Appellants' Brief, pp. 37-40.
The amount of snow presently in the mountains, Respondent's Brief, p. 14--a fact outside
the record in this case-has no bearing on Count 1. As certainly as there are wet years in Idaho,
there will most certainly be dry years in Idaho-we live in an arid state after all. See Nelson v.
Marshall, 94 Idaho 726, 732, 497 P.2d 47, 53 (1972). Again, Count 1 is about Landowners'
constitutional rights (1) to consent (or withhold consent) before water dedicated to their properties
is taken from them and (2) to have an enforceable claim to such dedicated surface water that is
superior to the claim of others who own lands to which such surface water has not before been
applied. Idaho Constitution, Art. XV, §§ 4 and 5. Neither the level of snow nor the determination
of whether this is a wet year or a dry year has an effect upon Landowners' constitutional rights.
Further, based on the Temple Affidavits, A&B contends "that all landowners, not just the
[Landowners], pay assessments for the storage water." Respondent's Brief, p. 15 (emphasis in
original). This fact is irrelevant for three reasons.
First, it is the "sale, rental, or distribution" of water by an appropriator (distributor)--for
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its beneficial use by the water user (distributee)-that is "deemed an exclusive dedication." Idaho
Constitution, Art. XV, § 4. That exclusive dedication carries the legal consequences and rights
Landowners claim have been violated by A&B. See Idaho Constitution, Art. XV, §§ 4 and 5. It
is not payment, but beneficial use that is utterly "enmeshed in the nature of a water right." Pioneer,
144 Idaho at 113, 157 P.3d at 607; see also Idaho Code §§ 42-101, 42-104, 42-217, 42-219(5).
Whether Unit B has paid for surface water rights has no bearing on Count 1, because it does not
affect the exclusive dedication of surface water on Landowners' properties.
Second, this Court has recognized that "the beneficial users [of water] have an interest

that is stronger than mere contractual expectancy." Pioneer, 144 Idaho at 114, 157 P.3d at 608
(emphasis added). Thus, to whatever extent the payment of assessments associated with storage
water creates any expectation or right to the storage water, such an expectation or right is merely
contractual and subordinate to the constitutional and statutory interest of the beneficial users in
that storage water. Id. (indicating that the superior interest of a beneficial user of water creates a
"perpetual right"); see also Wilterding, 4 Idaho at _ _ , 45 P. at 135 (noting that the Idaho
Constitution "gives the party using such water under the conditions a perpetual right to such use").
Finally, Landowners believe that A&B's assertion is taken out of context. For instance, in
1959, BOR responded to some concerns expressed by Unit A members that "great and
irreconcilable differences exist between" Unit A and Unit B, by explaining that "[p]ower costs
must be apportioned on a [district]-wide per-acre basis." R., p. 465. 177 individual wells used in
Unit B (A & B Irr. Dist. v. IDWR, 153 Idaho at 503, 284 P.3d at 228) must require more power
than the 1 pump station (that existed before the Project) used in Unit A. Thus, just as A&B
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contends that everyone in the irrigation district pays for Unit A's storage water, it must concede
that everyone in the irrigation district also pays for the electrical power required primarily for Unit
B's groundwater. In fact, Landowners' counsel pointed out this fact at the hearing on Landowners'

Motionfor Reconsideration. Tr., p. 68, L. 19-p. 69, L. 7.
Once distributed, water is dedicated to particular lands by its application to beneficial use
thereon and that water cannot then be taken from the property to which it is appurtenant without
the landowner's consent. Idaho Constitution, Art. XV, § 4. Further, as between distributees,
"priority in time shall give superiority of right to the use of such water." Idaho Constitution, Art.
XV, § 5. Only the Landowner's consent can cede any portion of the dedicated water supply to
junior distributees; the self-serving votes of the majority of an irrigation district's patrons cannot
take a senior distributee's dedicated water. See Bradshaw, 85 Idaho at 546, 381 P.2d at 450.
2. A&B is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to Count 2 because the prior
Judicial Confirmation Proceeding has no preclusive effect and Bradshaw shows the
due process concerns erroneously ignored by the District Court.
A&B' s argument in regard to Count 2 is that Landowners "could not collaterally attack the
final judgment in [the Judicial Confirmation Proceeding] and therefore the claim was barred by
the doctrine of res judicata." Respondent's Brief, p. 25 (citing R., p. 384 (the First Decision)). For
purposes of this argument, A&B introduced many facts.

See Respondent's Brief, pp. 26-27

(recounting the prior facts bearing on the application of res judicata to Count 2). A&B then
attempts to reduce Landowners' argument in this regard to two points: "1) the [District Court]
erred in taking judicial notice of the [Judicial Confirmation Proceeding]; and 2) the assessment
violates their constitutional rights." Respondent's Brief, p. 27. The first point, regarding the error
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of taking judicial notice of collateral proceedings while applying the Rule 12(b) standard is
addressed above. See Section 11.C.2., supra. The second point is an issue for summary judgment.
Landowners would also add a third point, addressed previously: given the Judicial Confirmation
Proceeding, res judicata does not apply to bar Count 2. See Appellants ' Brief, pp. 40-44.
The District Court listed the elements of both claim preclusion and issue preclusion,
although it provided absolutely no analysis applying them to Count 2. R., pp. 382-83. A&B does
not even describe the elements of either aspect of res judicata-let alone provide any analysis.

Respondent's Brief, pp. 28-33. A&B's sole point in relation to res judicata lies in quoting the
District Court's brief mention of resjudicata at the May 9, 2016, hearing. Respondent's Brief, p.
27 (quoting Tr., p. 46, L. 25-p. 47, L. 11). Landowners have already explained the reasons why
neither aspect of res judicata applies to bar Count 2. Appellants' Brief, pp. 42-43.
Instead of actually engaging with the elements of res judicata, A&B (like the District
Court) focuses on Landowners' lack of appeal from the Judicial Confirmation Proceeding.

Respondent's Brief, p. 27. This seems to confuse res judicata with administrative exhaustion,
since Landowners "had another avenue that [they] didn't take." Respondent's Brief, p. 27 (quoting
Tr., p. 47, L. 10-11). Landowners were not required to appeal from the Judicial Confirmation
Proceeding. Landowners agree with Judge Crabtree's conclusion in the Judicial Confirmation
Proceeding that the constitutional issues raised there by landowners were beyond the scope of that
proceeding. R., pp. 231-32. Contrary to the District Court's position, in order to apply res judicata
(or anything like it), the District Court had to decide whether "Judge Crabtree was right or wrong."
Tr., p. 47, L. 3-4. As the party moving for summary judgment in this regard, the burden of
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demonstrating Judge Crabtree's error and the applicability of resjudicata falls on A&B. Aardema,
147 Idaho at 793,215 P.3d at 513. Having failed to meet that burden, there was (and is) no basis
for the District Court (or this Court) to grant summary judgment as to Count 2 for A&B. Id.
The fact that A&B has not shown error in Judge Crabtree's conclusion in the Judicial
Confirmation Proceeding is also determinative of another of A&B' s arguments in this regard.
A&B contends that, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 43-405, if a member of an irrigation district fails to
appear and protest at the apportionment hearing, he cannot raise any challenge to the resulting
assessment in any manner in any forum. Respondent's Brief, p. 31. However, if Judge Crabtree
was correct that Landowners' constitutional claims were beyond the statutorily-mandated scope
of the Judicial Confirmation Proceeding (and Landowners believe he was correct), how can Idaho
Code § 43-405 operate to bar any litigation of such an issue? Landowners would be left without
any possible forum in which to bring their constitutional claims and be heard, in violation of their
due process rights. Because Judge Crabtree was correct, this case was the appropriate place to
bring their claim in Count 2.
This leads to A&B' s contention that Landowners were provided with due process by the
statutory process of Chapter 4 of Title 43, Idaho Code. Respondent's Brief, p. 32. In part,
due process requires that there must be some process to ensure that the
individual is not arbitrarily deprived of his rights in violation of the
state or federal constitutions. This requirement is met when the defendant
is provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard. The opportunity
to be heard must occur "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner" in order to satisfy the due process requirement. Due process
is not a concept to be applied rigidly in every matter. Rather, it is a flexible
concept calling for such procedural protections as are warranted by the
particular situation.
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Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 91,982 P.2d 917,926 (1999) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted, emphasis added); see also Cowan v. Bd. of Comm 'rs of
Fremont Cnty., 143 Idaho 501, 512-13, 148 P.3d 1247, 1258-59 (2006); Salladay v. Bowen, 161
Idaho 563, ~-' 388 P.3d 577,580 (2017). Thus, once again, if Judge Crabtree's conclusion that
Landowners' constitutional claims were beyond the scope of the Judicial Confirmation Proceeding
was correct, then under A&B' s contention, there would be no meaningful opportunity for
Landowners to be heard. In other words, the statutory process may provide adequate due process
as to all claims that fall within the scope of such a confirmation proceeding; but where, as here, a
claim is outside the scope of a confirmation proceeding, the same statutory process does not
provide adequate procedural due process. Count 2 falls into this later category of claims.
Finally, the notion that Landowners have harmed their claims in Count 2 because they
"voluntarily paid the 2016 assessment levied by [A&B]" is unavailing. Respondent's Brief, p. 32.
Landowners addressed this at oral argument. Tr., p. 40, L. 22-p. 41, L. 12. Briefly, if Landowners
refused to pay their assessments, A&B would be entitled to place a lien upon and even foreclose
on Landowners' properties. See Idaho Code§ 43-701, et seq. In effect, Landowners had to pay
the assessments or face these statutory penalties during the pendency of this litigation.
3. A&B is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to Count 3 because A&B is
diluting the water available to Landowners in violation of A&B' s fiduciary duties.
A&B's argument in relation to Count 3 appears to be centered entirely on the justiciability
of Count 3. See Respondent's Brief, p. 25 ("Without a real or threatened injury ... there was no
reason to analyze whether any duty had been breached as required under Idaho trust law"). Count
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3 is justiciable. See Section 11.A.2., supra. Thus, as A&B has not actually challenged either
element of Count 3, there is no burden on Landowners to prove anything-the Amended Complaint
is sufficient. Aardema, 147 Idaho at 793,215 P.3d at 513; see also Appellants' Brief, pp. 44-46.
Courts have always determined equitable terms in the case of water disputes.

See

Wilterding, 4 Idaho at __, 45 P. at 136. In Count 3, Landowners asked the District Court to

declare whether A&B was acting equitably and in accordance with its fiduciary duties.
Erroneously, the District Court refused to do so. The Project will dilute the limited supply of
water, decreasing the supply available to Landowners. This violates the fiduciary duties A&B
owes to Landowners-a prudent person would not dilute a limited supply of a finite resource that
had been applied for decades for the benefit of certain beneficiaries, even if doing so benefits other
beneficiaries. See Idaho Code§ 15-7-302. A trustee cannot favor certain beneficiaries.
F. This Court should not award attorney fees to A&B because there is no basis to do so.

First, because A&B should not prevail on this appeal, an award of attorney fees would be
inappropriate. Idaho Code§§ 12-117, 12-121 (both requiring a prevailing party analysis).
Second, A&B's main argument-which is unpersuasive-is that Landowners "ignore the
case law and governing statutes and continue to make the same exact arguments they made before
the District Court." Respondent's Brief, p. 38. However, A&B seems to forget that "appellate
courts will not consider new arguments raised for the first time on appeal." English v. Taylor, l 60
Idaho 73 7, 741, 378 P .3d 1036, 1040 (2016), reh 'g denied (Sept. 13, 2016) (citation omitted).
Thus, Landowners cannot make wholly new arguments.

Further, as demonstrated by both

Appellants 'Brief and in this Appellants ' Reply Brief, Landowners have not ignored Idaho law and
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have specifically tailored this brief to respond to the issues raised by A&B in Respondent's Brief
1. A&B' s request for attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-117 should be denied because
Landowners have a reasonable basis in law and fact for making this appeal.
A&B cites Rangen as an explanation of why it should be awarded attorney fees under Idaho
Code § 12-117. Respondent's Brief, pp. 39-40 (citing Rangen, Inc. v. Idaho Dep 't of Water Res.,
159 Idaho 798, __ , 367 P.3d 193, 207 (2016)). A&B emphasizes the points that an award is
appropriate where, on appeal, a·party "continued to rely on the same arguments used in front of
the district court, without providing any additional persuasive law or bringing into doubt the
existing law on which the district court based its decision." Rangen, 159 Idaho at _ _, 367 P.3d
at 207. Here, while Landowners' arguments were not prevailing before the District Court, even
that court did not find them "unmeritorious." Respondent's Brief, p. 39; see also R., pp. 639-41.
Further, Landowners have explained the manner in which the District Court erred; have asked this
Court to rule on some under-developed areas oflaw (such as the current applicability of Bradshaw
and the Idaho Constitution, as well as the scope of A&B' s fiduciary duties to members); and have
adapted this reply brief to the issues raised in Respondent's Brief Thus, in any event, Landowners
have pursued this appeal "with[] a reasonable basis in fact [and] law." Idaho Code§ 12-117.
2. A&B request for attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 should be denied because
A&B cites inapplicable law and has not shown that this appeal 1s frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation.
In relation to Idaho Code§ 12-121, A&B cites the incorrect standard. Respondent's Brief,
pp. 40-41. A&B contends that this Court should award attorney fees "when 'justice so requires."'

Respondent's Brief, p. 40 (citing Idaho Code§ 12-121; Hoffer v. Shappard, 160 Idaho 868, 883,
380 P.3d 681,696 (2016)). The new rule of law in Hoffer, which recognized the province of the
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Idaho Legislature to legislate, was to be effective March 1, 2017. Hoffer, 160 Idaho at 882-83,
380 P.3d at 695-96. In the interim-and before A&B filed Respondent's Brief-the Idaho
Legislature reacted and has amended Idaho Code § 12-121, effective March 1, 2017. H.B. 97
(Idaho 2017) ("H.B. 97"). H.B. 97 was signed by the Governor on March 1, 2017. 6 H.B. 97 also
contains a declaration of emergency, putting the amended statute into effect immediately. H.B.
97, § 4. As amended, the statute now reads, in relevant part:
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the
prevailing party or parties when the judge finds that the case was brought,
pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. This
section shall not alter, repeal or amend any statute which that otherwise
provides for the award of attorney's fees.
Idaho Code§ 12-121; see also H.B. 97, § 2. The Legislature also repealed the prior enactment of
the "when justice so requires" language, H.B. 97, § 3, and declared its intent "to reinstate and make
no change to Idaho law on attorney's fees as it existed" before Hoffer. H.B. 97, § 1.
As a result of this legislative action--completed, signed by the Governor, and effective
before A&B ever submitted Respondent's Brief-A&B' s argument under the Hoffer standard is
not applicable. Further, because the only case cited by A&B, i.e., Frantz v. Hawley Troxell Ennis
& Hawley LLP, 161 Idaho 60, _ , 383 P.3d 1230, 1236 (2016) (cited at Respondent's Brief, p.

41), was decided after Hoffer, it is not binding authority in applying the frivolous standard under
the amended Idaho Code§ 12-121. H.B. 97, § 1 (specifying "that this legislation be construed in
harmony with Idaho Supreme Court decisions on attorney's fees that were issued before

6

The progress of H.B. 97 is shown at: https://legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/2017/legislation/H0097 /. Its text is
available at: https://legislature.idaho.gov/wp-content/uploads/sessioninfo/2017/legislation/H0097 .pdf.
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[Hoffer]"). Having submitted no valid authority in support of an award of fees under Idaho Code

§ 12-121, even were A&B to prevail, it cannot be awarded attorney fees under that statute.

Further, substantively, Landowners have not pursued this appeal frivolously, unreasonably
or without foundation. Landowners have not asked this Court to re-weigh the evidence, but have
submitted the case on the evidence in the record (which Landowners nevertheless contend is
underdeveloped) and correct the District Court's numerous errors.

III.

CONCLUSION.

The songbird in Aesop's Fable was foolish to only take precautions against being caught
after it was already in a cage. AESOP'S FABLES 172-73. Ifit had wisely acted sooner, the songbird
could have avoided its catastrophe. This case is Landowners' attempt to take precautions-and
assert their rights-before they experience the catastrophic effects of dire water shortage.
"Precautions are useless after the event." Id. Landowners do not have to wait for their crops to
die, parched in their fields, before they can bring this case. The District Court erred in refusing to
engage with the Idaho Constitution and expediting the dismissal of Landowners' claims. These
errors must be reversed.

Dated this

~c(,I,day of April, 201 7.
Robert L. Harris, Esq.
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
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